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Abstract
This paper studies how different NOx abatement technologies have diffused under
the Swedish system of refunded emissions charges and analyzes the determinants of the
time to adoption. The policy, under which the charge revenues are refunded back to the
regulated firms in proportion to energy output, was explicitly designed to affect invest-
ment in NOx-reducing technologies. The results indicate that a higher net NOx charge
liability, i.e. a reduction in tax liabilities net of the refund due to the new technology,
increases the likelihood of adoption, but only for end-of-pipe post-combustion technolo-
gies. We also find some indication that market power considerations in the heat and
power industry reduce the incentives to abate emissions through investment in post-
combustion technologies. Adoption of post-combustion technologies and the efficiency
improving technology of flue gas condensation are alsomore likely in the heat and power
and waste incineration sectors, which is possibly explained by a large degree of public
ownership in these sectors.
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1 Introduction
The long-run impact of emission regulations is mainly determined by the incentives they
provide for innovation and diffusion of more environmentally benign technologies. In Swe-
den, a charge on NOx emissions from large combustion plants was introduced in 1992, as a
complement to the existing system of individual emission standards (SEPA, 2003). The reg-
ulation, under which the charge revenues are refunded back to the regulated firms in pro-
portion to energy output, was explicitly designed to affect technology investment (Sterner
& Turnheim, 2009). Judging from the significant reductions in emission intensities achieved
since the introduction of the policy, this objective would appear to have been reached.
However, changes in emission intensities is the combined result of upfront investments
in abatement technology, fuel switching, and improved knowledge of how to optimize the
combustion process (Ho¨glund-Isaksson & Sterner, 2009). Sterner & Turnheim (2009) sought
to separate reductions in emission intensities at the regulated Swedish plants into contribu-
tions from technology diffusion versus innovation and found both factors very important.
In this paper, we focus on one of these factors: the diffusion process for NOx-reducing tech-
nologies.
Technology diffusion generally follows an S-shaped pattern over time, in which the num-
ber of adopters initially increases slowly until a point in time at which adoption starts to
increase rapidly, followed by a period of leveling off when most potential adopters have
already invested. Early literature such as Griliches (1957) tried to explain this pattern with
epidemic models capturing the spread of knowledge and information about the new tech-
nology (Popp, 2010).
More recent literature has attempted to find mechanisms which explain differences in
preferred dates of adoption among potential adopters. Karshenas & Stoneman (1993) de-
scribed three such mechanisms: rank, stock and order effects. The rank effects results from
the different inherent characteristics of the firms, such as size and industrial sector, which
affects the gains from adoption of the new technology and in turn the preferred adoption
dates. A stock effect is present if the gains of the marginal adopter decreases as the num-
ber of previous adopters increases, e.g., because previous adopters increase their output
and thereby depress industry prices and the return for the next adopter. An order effect is
present if early adopters can achieve a higher return than the late adopters, e.g., because
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the first adopters can preempt the pool of skilled labor. Karshenas & Stoneman (1993) also
developed a decision-theoretical model which they linked to a proportional hazard model
to empirically assess the influence of rank, stock, order and epidemic effects on the pattern
of diffusion.
Popp (2010) used the framework in Karshenas & Stoneman (1993) to analyze adoption
of NOx control technologies at coal-fired power plants in the US. He found that expecta-
tions of future technological advances slow down the diffusion of combustion modification
technologies. Due to the differences in regulation across states, he could also identify envi-
ronmental regulations as the dominating determinants behind adoption of both combustion
as well as post-combustion technologies.
A recent strand of theoretical literature (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Bauman
et al., 2008; Calel, 2011) have also highlighted the fact that different types of abatement tech-
nologies have different impacts on the marginal costs of abatement and production. This in
turn implies that adoption incentives provided by environmental regulations differ across
different types of abatement technologies and that the drivers behind the diffusion of these
technologies are likely to be different.
A distinction is often made between end-of-pipe technologies that are add-on measures
that curb emissions after their formation and clean technologies that reduce resource use
and/or pollution at the source (Frondel et al., 2007). Empirically, the drivers for investments
in end-of-pipe versus clean technologies have been explored by Frondel et al. (2007) and
Hammar & Lo¨fgren (2010). The results of Frondel et al. (2007) suggest that regulatory mea-
sures and the stringency of environmental policy are positively correlated with investment
in end-of-pipe technologies while investment in clean technologies seem to be motivated
by market forces and the potential for cost savings. Hammar & Lo¨fgren (2010) found that
the price of energy is an important determinant for investments in end-of-pipe technologies
while internal learning by doing as measured by expenditures on green R&D increase the
probability of investment in clean technologies. Their results also suggested that the two
types of technologies are complementary.
Other studies (e.g. Millock & Nauges, 2006; del Rı´o Gonza´lez, 2005; Pizer et al., 2001)
identify cost savings, industry sector, plant size and financial strength such as self-financing
capacity, profits and resources at the parent company as important determinants for adop-
tion of clean technologies.
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This study contributes to the literature on the drivers of technology diffusion by compar-
ing the determinants of the time to adoption for three types of environmental technologies;
first, technologies which reduce the formation of NOx at combustion; second, end-of-pipe
NOx technologies; and lastly, technologies which improve energy efficiency. We do this for
plants regulated under a particular type of earmarked tax system which redistributes the
emission tax revenues from dirty to clean plants. Moreover, unlike many of the previous
studies analyzing diffusion of abatement technologies, which focus on diffusion within one
industry, we compare environmental technology adoption across different industry sectors.
We analyze the factors that affect the time and decision to invest in NOx abatement tech-
nologies by applying a proportional hazard model. The factors analyzed best explain adop-
tion of end-of-pipe post-combustion technologies. The results suggest that paying a higher
NOx charge net of the refund increases the likelihood of adoption of this type of technology.
We also find indications of economies of scale and that market power considerations in the
heat and power industry reduces the incentives to invest in post-combustion technologies.
Adoption of post-combustion technologies and the efficiency improving technology of flue
gas condensation is also more likely in the heat and power and waste incineration sectors.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the Swedish NOx poli-
cies in more detail and the incentives they provide for the regulated plants. Section 3 gives a
brief overview of different NOx-reducing technologies. Section 4 introduces the theoretical
framework and our empirical model. Section 5 describes the data and explanatory variables
and section 6 the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 NOx policies
This section describes the Swedish NOx policies for large combustion plants in the form of
the refunded NOx charge and individual emission standards. It also describes the incentives
for emission reductions provided under this combination of policies.
2.1 The Swedish NOx charge
The Swedish charge on NOx emissions from large combustion plants was introduced in
1992. At the time, close to 25% of Swedish NOx emissions came from stationary combustion
sources and the charge was seen as a faster and more cost-efficient way of reducing NOx
emissions than the existing system of individual emission standards (SEPA, 2003).
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Because NOx emissions vary significantly with temperature and other combustion pa-
rameters (Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson, 2006), continuous measurement of the flue gas was
required to implement the charge. The installation of the measuring equipment was judged
too costly for smaller plants and the charge therefore only imposed on larger boilers. In
order not to distort competition between larger plants and smaller units not subjected to
the charge, a scheme was designed to refund the charges back to the regulated plants in
proportion to energy output.
Energy output within the NOx charge system is measured in terms of so-called useful
energy, which can be either in the form of electricity, steam or hot water depending on end-
use1. Regulated entities belong to the heat and power sector (between 1992 and 2009 on
average 52% of total useful energy production in the system), the pulp and paper industry
(on average 23% of useful energy production), the waste incineration sector (15%) and the
chemical (5.5%), wood (3.1%), food (1.7%) and metal (1.0%) industries. Initially the charge
only covered boilers and gas turbines with a yearly production of useful energy of at least
50 GWh, but in 1996 the threshold was lowered to 40 GWh and in 1997 further lowered to
25 GWh per year (Ho¨glund-Isaksson & Sterner, 2009).
From 1992 to 2007, the charge was 40 SEK/kg NOx2. In 2008, the charge was raised to 50
SEK/kg NOx following a series of reports from the SEPA which indicated that the impact of
the charge system had diminished over the years (SEPA, 2012). In real terms, the charge had
decreased over time and the increase to 50 SEK in 2008 was in practice a restoration of the
charge to the real level in 1992.
The practical procedure in the NOx system is as follows. At the end of January each year,
the firms declare emissions and production of useful energy at each production unit to the
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). At the end of June, SEPA publishes the
net charges to be paid at each facility. For firms paying a positive net charge, payment is
due by October 1, while firms receiving a net refund receive their money, at the latest, two
months later (SEPA, 2004).
1In the heat and power industry, useful energy is most often the amount of energy sold. For other industries,
it is defined as the steam, hot water or electricity produced in a boiler and used in the production process or for
heating of plant facilities (SEPA, 2003).
2Approximately 4e/ kg NOx. NOx is measured in kilograms of NO2. In air, NO is naturally converted
to NO2 and vice versa and the equilibrium ratio of NO to NO2 is determined by atmospheric conditions. A
kilogram of NO is converted into units of kilograms of NO2 by multiplying by the factor 46/30 (the molecular
mass ratio).
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2.2 Individual emission standards
Individual emission standards for NOx emissions from stationary sources were introduced
in 1988 and thuswere already in placewhen the chargeswere introduced (Ho¨glund-Isaksson
& Sterner, 2009). Any quantitative emission limits are determined by county authorities3 and
may vary with industry sector. Emission limits commonly cover nitrogen oxides, carbon
dioxide, carbon monoxide, sulfur, ammonia and particulate matter (SEPA, 2012).
In 2003, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) conducted an evaluation
of the effect of the emission standards compared to the NOx charge during the period 1997-
20014, finding that emission intensities for boilers not subject to emission restrictions were
higher than for boilers with restrictions. Emission intensities also remained unchanged for
boilers without restrictions during those years. In contrast, emission intensities were 11%
lower in 2001 compared to 1997 for boilers with restrictions. Relevant to note is that boilers
without emission standards often belonged to smaller plants and that fewer boilers in the
wood and pulp and paper industry were subject to restrictions, while restrictions were more
common for boilers in the waste incineration and heat and power sector. Because emissions
were generally much below the quantitative restrictions, the conclusion from SEPA (2003) is
that, for boilers in the heat and power and waste incineration sectors, the NOx charge was
more effective than the restrictions in reducing NOx emissions. Figure 1 illustrates that the
emission standards do not appear to have been the binding factor limiting emissions in 2001
for any of the boilers which were part of the NOx charge system in both 1997 and 2001 and
which were subject to an emission standard in terms of mg NOx per MJ of fuel at the time
when SEPA audited the plant.
Since the SEPA (2003) evaluation, there has been no comprehensive survey of the emis-
sion standards and how they have developed over time. SEPA has supplied us with data
on emission standards in place in 2012 for 42 out of 50 firms in the NOx system, randomly
selected for an interview survey for the SEPA (2012) report. The majority of the quantitative
restrictions were in terms of mg NO2 per MJ of fuel5. Figure 2 illustrates the emission stan-
3They evaluate the plants with respect to the Environmental Code and issue permits which may entail quan-
titative restrictions on emissions of polluting substances.
4SEPA (2003) analyzed 228 boilers (of a total of 448 at the time) that were subject to charges during the period
1997-2001. Among the 228 boilers, 140 were subject to restrictions on NOx emissions. The restrictions were most
often in terms of yearly averages and in units of mg NOx per megajoule (MJ) of fuel but sometimes in other
units, e.g., mg NOx per m3 of fluegas.
5Out of 81 different forms of quantitative restrictions for the boilers at these firms, 52 were in terms of mg
NO2 per MJ of fuel, 25 in terms of mg NO2 per m3 of flue gas or ton of NO2 per year and 4 in terms of mg NO2
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dards for firms in this subsample with an emission standard in equivalent units of mg NOx
per MJ of fuel. In most cases, we do not know in which year the standard came into effect
and for the comparison with actual emissions we therefore illustrate emissions as an aver-
age over the period 1992-2009. Nevertheless, from Figure 2 it appears as if on average the
standard has not been binding over the period. However, we cannot rule out the possibility
that the standard was binding at some point in time.
In the interviews at the surveyed firms, some respondents viewed the standards as a
more important factor than the NOx charge. Respondents also said that the standards made
it more difficult to trade off different emission-reducing measures. The often strong nega-
tive correlation between CO and NOx emissions makes quantitative restrictions on carbon
monoxide especially relevant. It appears that authorities generally have increased the strin-
gency of restrictions on CO since the 1990s, making it more difficult in later years to trade
off NOx emissions for emissions of CO. Unfortunately, we lack data on these CO restric-
tions. Some of the interview respondents also claimed that authorities in some counties issue
more stringent emission standards compared to other counties (SEPA, 2012) - an observation
which we attempt to control for in our estimations.
2.3 Incentives provided by NOx charge and standards
To describe the incentives provided by the NOx charge and the most common form of emis-
sion standard, we consider a firm (with only one boiler for expositional clarity) which faces
a refunded NOx charge at the level of s per unit of emissions. It has a technology k installed
and the cost of generating qi units of useful energy with emission intensity # i is Ci,k(qi, # i) for
firm i. Firm-level emissions is given by ei = # iqi and total emissions from all firms covered
by the NOx charge by E = åi ei. With total production of useful energy Q = åi qi over all
firms and boilers, we define the average emission intensity # = EQ . The firm chooses the level
of useful energy production and emission intensity which minimize the cost of the NOx reg-
ulation and satisfy a minimum level of useful energy, qi, and an emission standard, x i (equal
to infinity in case of the absence of a standard). Since the emission standards are often ex-
pressed in terms of units of emissions per unit of input energy, we write input energy as qiji,k
where ji,k is the energy efficiency of the boiler, and define the standard as a constraint on
per ton of pulp or paper. One heat and power plant and a production line at one waste incineration plant instead
had technology standards mandating SNCR (or equivalent) and SCR, respectively.
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eiji,k
qi
.
In its most intuitive form the cost minimization problem can be written
min
qi ,#i
Ci,k(qi, ei) + sei   sE qiQ (1)
subject to
qi  qi
eiji,k
qi
 x i.
The second term in (1) is the total NOx charge payment for firm i and the third term is
the size of the total refund which is negative and lowers compliance cost. Following Fischer
(2011), we can also write the minimization problem in (1) on a more compact form as
min
qi ,#i
Ci,k(qi, # i) + s [# i   #] qi (2)
subject to
qi  qi (3)
# iji,k  x i. (4)
We will in the following refer to s [# i   #] as the net NOx charge which is in units of
SEK per unit of useful energy. The net NOx charge is positive for a firm with an emission
intensity higher than the average emission intensity #, i.e., # i > #, and negative for a firmwith
an emission intensity which is lower than average, i.e., # i < #. That is to say, the refunded
NOx charge serves to raise the average cost of energy production for the firms that are dirtier
than average and lower the average cost for the firms that are cleaner than average.
The two first-order conditions (FOCs) for the cost-minimizing energy production, qi,k,
and emission intensity, #i,k, with technology k are
¶Ci,k(qi,k, #

i,k)
¶qi
+ s

#i,k   #
 
1  q

i,k
Q

= lqi (5)
 ¶Ci,k(q

i,k, #

i,k)
¶# i
1
qi,k
= s

1  q

i,k
Q

+ lx i
ji,k
qi,k
(6)
with the complementary slackness conditions
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lqi  0, lqi [qi,k   qi] = 0
lx i
 0, lx i [#

i,kji,k   x i] = 0.
According to the FOCs, the firm should choose the useful energy production and emis-
sion intensity that makes marginal cost inclusive of the net NOx charge equal to the shadow
price of useful energy (condition (5)). At the same time, it should set the marginal abatement
cost equal to the sum of the NOx charge6 and the shadow price on the emissions constraint
(condition (6)).
It is quite natural to assume that constraint (3) is binding with a shadow price of useful
energy which is larger than zero. In contrast, if a standard is so lax that constraint (4) is not
binding or no standard exists then FOC (6) reduces to
 ¶Ci,k(q

i,k, #

i,k)
¶# i
1
qi,k
= s

1  q

i,k
Q

. (7)
Comparing (6) and (7), we see that if the marginal cost is non-decreasing in the emission
intensity, a firm with a binding individual emission standard (i.e., lx i > 0) should choose a
lower emission intensity than a firm with a comparable boiler without a binding emission
standard (operating at the same level of efficiency and producing the same level of output).
This is to say, a binding standard induces the firm to operate at a marginal cost of abatement
which is higher than the NOx charge.
Note that the annual gains, gi, from adopting a new technology k = 1 when boiler i
already has technology k = 0 installed can be represented as:
gi =
h
Ci,0(qi,0, #

i,0)  Ci,1(qi,1, #i,1)
i
+
h
s

#i,0   #

qi,0   s

#i,1   #

qi,1
i
. (8)
The first term on the right hand side of expression (8) represents the reduction in produc-
tion and abatement costs due to the new technology while the second term represents the
reduction in tax liabilities net of the refund. The extent to which refunding increases adop-
6The adjustment
h
1  q

i,k
Q
i
in (5) and (6) reflects the fact that a firm with a larger share in total useful energy
qi,k
Q pays a lower effective charge on emissions than a firm with a smaller share. In (5), it also implies that an
above average emitter pays a lower net NOx charge and a below average emitter gets a lower marginal net
subsidy with a larger market share (Fischer, 2011). See Fischer (2011) for more details on the incentives provided
by the refunded charge. In practice, the average boiler share in total useful energy is 0.3% with a maximum of
4.1%. At firm level, the share is on average 2.1%, with a maximum of 11.7%, suggesting that the market share
distortion is perhaps relevant only for the largest heat and power producers.
9
tion gains depends on the average emissions intensity, which is endogenous to the adoption
decisions taken by all firms in the industry.
3 NOx abatement technologies
As shown by Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson (2006) and demonstrated in the previous sec-
tion, the system of refunded emission charges taxes firms which have higher than average
emission intensities and therefore pay more in charges than they receive in refunds and it
rewards firms which have lower than average emission intensities and receive a net refund.
Therefore, the refunded NOx charge encourages competition among the regulated plants for
the lowest emissions per unit of useful energy. The policy should therefore spur adoption
of technologies which decrease emission intensities. Such technologies include both purely
emission reducing technologies and technologies which improve energy efficiency.
NOx-emission reducing technologies can be divided into combustion and post-combustion
technologies. Combustion technologies are designed to inhibit the formation of NOx in the
combustion stage, e.g., by lowering temperature, controlling air supply or enhancing the
mixing of flue gases. Examples of such technologies installed at the Swedish plants are flue
gas recirculation, ECOTUBE technology, injection technology, low-NOx burner, reburner,
over-fire-air, rotating over-fire-air and ROTAMIX technology (Ho¨glund-Isaksson & Sterner,
2009).
Post-combustion technologies, on the other hand, are end-of-pipe solutions that reduce
NOx in the flue gases after the combustion stage, either through catalytic or non-catalytic
reduction of NOx compounds. Selective catalytic reduction (SCR) uses ammonia or urea
to reduce NOx into water and molecular nitrogen (N2) on catalytic beds at lower tempera-
tures. SCR is highly efficient in reducing NOx emissions but is a large and costly installation.
Selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) on the other hand does not require catalysts and
cooling of the flue gases and is therefore less costly but also less efficient (Ho¨glund-Isaksson
& Sterner, 2009). Emission reductions can be as high as 90%with SCR compared to 35%with
SNCR (Linn, 2008).
Flue gas condensation is a technology which improves energy efficiency and has been
adopted by many of the regulated Swedish plants. It recovers heat from the flue gases and
improves energy efficiency without increasing NOx emissions (Ho¨glund-Isaksson & Sterner,
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2009). This installation would therefore help to reduce a boiler’s emission intensity and
thereby decrease the firm’s net charge.
One important determinant of adoption is naturally investment cost. The cost of in-
stalling combustion technologies are highly variable across different boilers. Costs depend
on size, purification requirements, system of injection, type of chemicals used and the com-
plexity of the control system. According to Linn (2008), the total installation cost of a low
NOx burner or a overfire air injector is in the US roughly 10 million USD, although it varies
with boiler characteristics.
Investment costs for the post-combustion technologies SCR and SNCR are also boiler and
plant specific and vary with boiler capacity, among other things (SEPA, 2012). Linn (2008)
also notes that the cost of retrofitting SCR and SNCR varies with plant characteristics but
quotes cost estimates for the US of 40 million USD for SCR as opposed to about 20 USD for
SNCR over the lifetime of the unit.
Moreover, some technologies are not commercially available below certain size thresh-
olds (Sterner & Turnheim, 2009). Technology adoption also depends on access to information
and the degree of involvement in R&D and innovation activities (Sterner & Turnheim, 2009),
which would seem to support the existence of learning effects.
This brief overview illustrates that there is a wide variety of technologies for plant man-
agers to choose from when responding to the NOx regulations. Moreover, because post-
combustion allows firms to choose emissions independently from output to a much larger
extent than the combustion technologies, the adoption of these two types of technologies
might differ in responsiveness to the NOx charge7. In our empirical analysis, we follow Popp
(2010) and group the NOx abatement technologies into two main categories to separately
analyze the determinants of adoption for combustion technologies versus post-combustion
technologies. Additionally, we also analyze investment in flue gas condensation because the
NOx charge system’s focus on emission intensities may have increased the attractiveness of
not only emissions-reducing but also energy efficiency improving technologies.
7Sterner & Turnheim (2009) found that, as expected from their characteristics, SCR followed by SNCR pro-
vided the most significant and sizable reductions in emission intensities.
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4 Model of the investment decision
We use the framework in Karshenas & Stoneman (1993) and consider a situation in which a
firm has the choice to install a new technology in a boiler iwhich is included in the refunded
NOx charge system. The cost of doing the installation at time t is I(Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t)where
Zi(t) is a vector of boiler-specific characteristics which may affect investment costs. Li(t) is
a vector of the number boilers at the plant and firm that unit i belongs to and that may
give rise to internal learning effects which decrease investment costs. Si(t) is the stock of
boilers already installed with the new technology in the industry of unit iwhich could affect
investment costs if there are external learning effects.
By switching to the new technology, the gross profit gain of the boiler in period t increases
by gi(t) = g(Ri(t),Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t), where Ri(t) is the NOx charge liabilities for boiler i
in period t before adoption. The net present value of making the investment at time t is
Vi(t) =
¥Z
t
g(Ri(t),Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t)e r(t t)dt   I(Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t).
Following Karshenas & Stoneman (1993), we specify the conditions which determine
the investment decision: the profitability condition and the arbitrage condition. Clearly, for
adoption to be considered at all, it is necessary that the investment yields positive profits,
i.e.,
Vi(t) > 0. (9)
Furthermore, for it not to be profitable at time t to wait longer to adopt, it is necessary that
yi(t)  d(Vi(t)e
 rt)
dt
 0.
Differentiating with respect to t we get
yi(t) =  g(Ri(t),Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t) + rI(Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t)  dI(Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t)dt  0.
(10)
According to (10), it is not profitable to wait longer to adopt at time t if the profit gains in
period t is larger or equal to the cost of adoption in period t given by the sum of the annuity
of the investment cost and the decrease in investment cost over time.
There are various factors that we cannot observe which also affect the timing and de-
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cision to adopt. We therefore introduce the stochastic term # which represents these unob-
served factors. If we assume that # is identically distributed across the firms and over time
with the distribution function F#(e), the condition that it must not be profitable to postpone
adoption to a later date becomes
yi(t) + #  0.
If we also consider the optimal time of adoption for firm i, ti , a random variable with
distribution function Fi(t), we can write
Fi(t) = Pr fti  tg = Pr f#   yi(t)g = F#( yi(t)) 8 i, t.
To estimate Fi(t), we start from the hazard rate hi(t) =
fi(t)
1 Fi(t) , where fi(t) is the probability
distribution of ti . The hazard rate is defined as the conditional probability of adoption at
time t, given that the firm has not adopted before t8.
As is common in the adoption literature (e.g., Karshenas & Stoneman, 1993; Popp, 2010;
Kerr & Newell, 2003), we estimate a proportional hazard model of the form
hi(t) = l0(t) exp(X0itb),
where l0(t) is the so called baseline hazard and Xit is composed of the vectors Ri(t), Zi(t),
Li(t) and Si(t) which are likely to affect whether the arbitrage condition in (10) is fulfilled.
A variable which negatively affects yi(t) should increase the hazard rate and vice versa.
The baseline hazard l0(t) is common to all units. We estimate semi-parametric Cox pro-
portional hazard models because the Cox model has the advantage that it does not require
any assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard. The Cox model is estimated using
the method of partial likelihood. A fully parametric proportional hazard model can be more
efficiently estimated by maximum likelihood but is less robust because it entails the risk of
misspecifying the baseline hazard (Cleves et al., 2004).
For simplicity, we have so far only discussed the adoption of a single technology. The
situation we are considering is however one where the plant managers can choose between
three different types of technologies. Similar to Stoneman & Toivanen (1997) who consider
diffusion of multiple technologies, we define gi,k(t) to be the gross profit gain at t from adop-
8The hazard rate is an event rate per unit of time. In the case of technology adoption, a hazard rate might be
intuitively thought of as the number of adopters divided by the number of units that have not still adopted, i.e.,
the survivors, at time t.
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tion of technology k relative to the no adoption scenario and vi,k(t, tk) to be an additive syn-
ergistic gross profit gain, which is the increase in gross profit at time t from adoption of
technology k at tk (tk  t) relative to the prior technological state9. The total gross profit
gain in time t from adoption of technology k at tk is then given by gi,k(t) + vi,k(t, tk)..
We now specify that gi,k(t) is a function of the previously discussed explanatory variables
with gi,k(t) = gk(Ri(t),Zi(t), Li,k(t), Si,k(t), t) with Li,k(t) the number of boilers at the plant
and firm with technology k installed and Si,k(t) the number of boilers in the industry of
unit i installed with technology k. Further, we specify vi,k(t, tk) as a function of the prior
technological state Di(tk) at the time of adoption of technology k as well as rank, stock and
learning effects, so that we can write vi,k(t, tk) = v(Di(tk),Zi(t), Li,k(t), Si,k(t)). We can now
specify our technology-specific hazard function as
hi,k(t) = hk(Ri(t),Di(t),Zi(t), Li,k(t), Si,k(t), t). (11)
We separately estimate a proportional hazard model for combustion, post-combustion
and flue gas condensation technology, respectively. We expect the sign on the dummy vari-
ables indicating prior technological state to be positive if the technologies are complements,
and negative if they are substitutes. We would expect the signs on Li,k(t) and Si,k(t) to be
positive if there is internal and external learning (as long as their effect on the rate of decrease
in investment costs is non-positive or not too large) and the sign on Si,k(t) to be negative if
there is an industry stock effect. Expectations on the sign of the coefficients on the boiler-
specific characteristics in Zi(t) and the NOx charge liabilities Ri(t) are discussed in more
detail in the next section.
5 Data and explanatory variables
The data covers the boilers monitored under the Swedish NOx charge system and is a panel
collected over the period 1992-2009 by SEPA. It contains the information on NOx emissions
and production of useful energy necessary to establish the charge liabilities and refunds. It
also includes survey information that covers which technologies are installed at each boiler
as well as information on boiler capacity and the share of different types of fuels in the fuel
9This additive profit gain could e.g. be the additional net decrease in production and regulatory costs from
installing a post-combustion technology when the boiler is already equipped with a combustion technology
relative to when it is not.
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mix. There is unfortunately no information on investment costs. Differences in investment
costs are therefore proxied by boiler and firm characteristics.
Our sample consists of 524 boilers for which the information required to estimate at least
one of the three econometric models is available10. Descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 1. As pointed out in section 2, the number of regulated boilers under the NOx scheme
increased in 1996 and 1997. Moreover, new boilers have become part of the scheme over
the period under analysis. Because the boilers which entered later into the system may
be different from the early entrants in their propensity to adopt, we estimate the empirical
model for the full sample and for the subsample of boilers that have been part of the NOx
scheme (and our panel) since 1992 (See Table 9 in the appendix) and compare the results.
5.1 Dependent variables - technology adoption
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has the particular
type of technology installed (combustion, post-combustion or flue gas condensation, respec-
tively) and zero otherwise11.
Figure 3 illustrates the diffusion pattern of the three technologies for the boilers in our
sample. There is a sharp increase in the adoption of both combustion and post-combustion
technologies from 1992 to 1993. The decline in the rate of adoption in the years 1995-1997 is
due to the entrance of many smaller units without the technologies installed. The number
of boilers changes each year depending on how many of the boilers paid the NOx charge in
that particular year. For example, in our sample there were 174 boilers paying the charge in
10The number of boilers paying the NOx charge has varied over the years because of the change of the pro-
duction threshold in 1996 and 1997 but also because of entrances of new boilers in other years and the option to
produce below the threshold even though emissions are monitored. 669 boilers paid the charge in at least one
year between 1992 and 2009 with 182 boilers paying the charge in 1992 and 427 boilers in 2009. Out of the 182
boilers in 1992, 19 boilers had at least one of the technologies installed in 1992; 7 had only a post-combustion tech-
nology installed, 3 had only a combustion technology installed, 5 had only condensation technology installed
and 4 boilers had a combination. Since we are using lagged variables to explain adoption and do not have data
before the start of the program in 1992, we cannot include these early adopters in our sample. These boilers are
however included in the sense that they might install another technology in one of the following years. Con-
cerning other boilers excluded from the sample, the boilers not included but paying the charge in at least one
year have on average significantly lower production of useful energy and a significantly lower share of boilers
with any of the technologies installed in any year between 1992 and 2009. These are not surprising results seeing
that a boiler for which information is missing for the estimations is likely to have produced below the threshold
and not been part of the charge and refunding scheme for most of the period. The profitability of installing the
technologies at such boilers which can strategically produce just below the threshold should reasonably be low.
Due to these observable differences, our results are likely not representative for boilers producing around the
production threshold.
11Because we are estimating hazard models, a boiler is only included in the estimation sample as long as it is
at risk of adopting or actually adopts. After the technology is installed, the boiler is dropped from the sample.
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1992 and 400 boilers in 2009. Starting in 1998 there is a steady increase in the share of boilers
with one of the three technologies installed and in 2009 close to 80% of the boilers in our
sample had at least one of the technologies.
5.2 Explanatory variables
Net NOx charge liabilities
From expression (8) it is clear that the NOx charge might affect the incentives to invest in a
new technology due to reductions in production and abatement costs and net NOx charge
liabilities. To account for changes in the production and abatement costs we control for a
series of rank and learning effects that are described later in this section. Unfortunately, we
cannot identify the effect of the stringency of the NOx charge because there has only been one
change to its level (in 2010) since its implementation in 1992. Moreover, the net reduction of
NOx charge liabilities may be endogenous to the adoption decisions because in a given year
the adoption of new technologymight determine the emission intensity. Thus, to circumvent
the potential endogeneity and identify the effect of the reduction in tax liabilities net of the
refund we estimate the adoption technology models in two steps.
 First, we estimate the expected emission intensity (#i,1) and output level (qi,1) when
adopting the new technology in two separated ordinary least squares regressions on
a group of exogenous variables. Since we do not observe what would have been the
emission intensity and the output level of the generation units that did not adopt the
new technology if they would have adopted, we estimate these regressions using only
the information of those boilers that adopted the new technology in the past. Then,
we use these estimated coefficients to predict what would have been the emission in-
tensities and output of the other generating units as if they would have adopted. In
this manner, we consider that firms make their decisions based on expectations about
emission intensities and output.
 Second, the predicted emission intensities and output obtained from the previous re-
gressions given a particular technology are used to compute the net NOx charge liabil-
ities according to equation (8). If the second term of equation (8) is positive then the
annual gains, gi, will increase due to the adoption of the new technology, stimulating
adoption.
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In the first step, the expected emission intensity is regressed on initial emission intensity,
average emission intensity of those firms adopting the technology until t-1, fuel shares in
the previous year for a mix of fuels, other NOx reducing technologies in t-1, volume of oxy-
gen in the combustion chamber 12, and a set of sector and boiler type dummies. We control
for the initial emissions of the generation units at the moment they entered the NOx charge
system. We may think that boilers with high initial emission intensity may also have high
emission intensity in the next years because of certain characteristics of the production pro-
cess of the firms, despite of the intensities might decline over time. We also consider that
generation units may be influenced by the past adoption decision of other firms in the same
sector. A positive effect of the average emission intensity of firms adopting the correspond-
ing technology until t-1 within the same sector on the emission intensity in the current year
is indicative that similar production processes with high emission intensities tend to adopt
the new technology to combat emissions. Since emissions are also dependant of fuel choice
we include fuel share as a proxy of the amount of fuel employed during the combustion.
There is a variety of fuels oil, coal, biofuel, peat, waste and gas.13 Oxygen availability in
the combustion chamber is one of the main factors that leads to an increase in thermal NOx
formation (EPA, 1999). Our assumption is that volume of oxygen has no direct effect on the
decision of adoption and that it is not correlated with other factors in the error term, its ef-
fect is indirect and only through the emission intensity. Therefore, volume of oxygen would
be an appropriate regressor if the set of main factors affecting the adoption decision are in-
cluded directly in the model and also if oxygen is statistically significant in the emission
intensity regression. Other variables that may work as additional exogenous variables are
the boiler types. They define the kind of energy production process: hot water production
plant (Nr.1), condensing power plants (Nr.2), backpressure plant (Nr.3), gas turbine (Nr.4),
steam-to-process plant (Nr.5), and the rest of production units (Nr.6). We also assume that
they influence the adoption decision only through the emission intensity equation. Since
few boilers belong to types Nr.2, 4 and 6, they are aggregated in one group.14
12Due to the presence of missing values for some boilers we express the volume of oxygen as a standardized
variable subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation across boilers per year. Then, the missing
values are replaced by the standardized mean.
13Because fuel shares are in percentage, we use natural gas as the reference case to compare the estimates with
regard to other fuels.
14The set of dummy variables is included in the the emission intensity regressions using as reference group of
hot water production plants (Nr.1).
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The equation for expected output has a similar specification as the expected emission
intensity regression. We control for initial output, average output of firms adopting the cor-
responding technology until t-1, fuel shares in t-1, a set of categorical variables for installed
capacity 15 and sectors. We also add the group of boiler type dummies as exogenous vari-
ables, which determine directly the output level. Under the approach of expectations we also
assume that #when firms are adopting the new technology is the average emission intensity
in the whole system that the firms observed in t-1. Such an assumption finds some support
in Sterner & Turnheim (2009) who suggest that reporting and yearly publication of emission
intensities probably act as an additional incentive for firms to compete for emission-reducing
measures.
Finally, as discussed in section 2.3, a confounding factor is the emission standards is-
sued for some of the boilers by county authorities. Unfortunately, we only have information
about the emission standards for a small randomly selected subsample of 42 firms. Anec-
dotal evidence tells us that some county authorities apply more stringent standards than
others. To try to capture some of the difference in regulatory stringency across regions, we
use the county location of the boilers for which we know the emission standard to construct
county average standards. We use these averages to divide the counties into two halves: one
with relatively more stringent standards, and one with relatively lax standards and estimate
our model separately for the two groups.
Technology substitutes or complements
To analyze how the prior technological state affects the investment decision, we include
dummy variables indicating whether the boiler was already equipped with the other two
types of technologies in the previous year, Combustion tech.t-1, Post-comb. tech.t-1 and Flue gas
cond. tech.t-1, respectively. If the technologies are substitutes, we would expect a negative
sign, while we would expect a positive sign if they are complements. We lag these variables
to avoid the issue of simultaneity in the investment decision across the three technologies.
Biofuel use
On the one hand, biofuel use releases high levels of NOx emissions relative to coal and gas,
15These variables are define in quartiles: capacity less than 13 MW (1st quartile), between 13 and 29 MW (2nd
quartile), between 29 and 70 MW (3rd quartile), and greater than 70 MW (4th quartile).
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whichmight lead to earlier adoption of NOx abatement technologies. On the other hand, bio-
fuel use might entail a lower cost as it is exempted from the Swedish CO2 tax and other reg-
ulations (Bra¨nnlund & Kristro¨m, 2001). To capture these dimensions, we include a measure
of relative expected cost of burning biofuels compared to other fuels, Bio/fossil fuel costt+1. In
calculating this ratio, the numerator is computed as the product of the biofuel share in the
total fuel mix in time t and the price of biofuel in t+ 1. The denominator is the product of the
fuel shares for other fuels (oil, gas, coal, peat and waste) in t and their respective pre-carbon
tax price in t + 1 plus the total CO2 cost of these fuels. The forwarded prices are used as
proxies of the expected prices. We employed the price of forest fuels (skogsflis) as the price
of biofuels, the price of EO1 oil as the oil price, and for simplicity a value of zero as the price
for waste. Regarding the CO2 fuel costs, climate policy in Sweden includes a carbon tax and
the price of carbon allowances in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
We calculate CO2 fuel costs at the boiler level considering the CO2 emissions of the fuel mix
and the differences in the carbon tax that apply to different sectors16. An additional concern
is that we do not control for the effect of the Tradable Green Certificates policy17 on techno-
logical adoption. Since we do not have information about the amount of green certificates
received by each combined heat and power plant and the specific fraction of useful energy
that is converted to electricity, we cannot identify directly the effect of this policy. However
as a robustness check, we construct a proxy that indicates if a generation unit might have
received green certificates and interact it with Bio/fossil fuel costt+1. This proxy consists of an
indicator variable equal to one if the boiler is a combined heat and power plant after 2003
and that burns biofuels and peat, which are considered as eligible fuels to receive the certifi-
cates.
Entry effects
We include the indicator variables Entrant 1996-1997 and Entrant 1998-2009, which are equal
16For CO2 emission factors see SEPA (2009). The carbon tax is based on the carbon content of the fuel; a
number of deductions and exemptions from the carbon tax have been introduced in different sectors, and this
also varies according to the type of generation in the case of the heat and power sector. Additionally, not all
the plants are part of the EU ETS system and the overlapping process with the carbon tax has added other
tax exemptions for the plants within the EU ETS. The EU ETS CO2 price employed to compute the CO2 fuel
costs is the yearly average spot price. We also tried including the sector-specific prices of CO2 separately as an
explanatory variable but this was not significant. Furthermore, considering potential reverse causality for the
use of biofuels, results remained largely unchanged when lagging the relative biofuel to fossil fuel cost.
17This scheme was introduced in Sweden on May 1, 2003 to increase the financial incentives for investment
and operation of power generation technologies based on renewable energy sources (Knutsson et al., 2006).
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to one if the boiler entered the NOx charge system in those years, and zero otherwise. Be-
cause Capacity is already controlling for differences in size between earlier and later entrants,
Entrant 1996-1997 and Entrant 1998-2009 should be capturing any other potential effect of
late entry into the system on the profitability of adopting cleaner technologies, such as lower
investment cost or the redistribution of charge revenues that might have occurred when
smaller and dirtier than average units entered and increased charge revenues in 1996 and
1997.
Rank effects
With respect to rank effects, i.e., inherent characteristics of the firm and boiler which may
affect adoption, we consider industry sector and boiler capacity. Firms in different industry
sectors face different economic conditions and levels of competition which may affect the
propensity and ability to adopt new technologies. The NOx charge may also affect the heat
and power industry differently than the other sectors since useful energy as it is defined is
the end product of the heat and power sector but mainly an intermediate input for the other
industries.
There are also some indications from SEPA (2003) that the stringency of quantitative
restrictions may vary between industry sectors, with the heat and power sector and waste
incineration possibly being subject to more stringent regulation. We include the dummy
variables Pulp-paper sector and Waste incineration and, due to the relatively small sample of
boilers in the remaining industries, a common dummy, Other sectors, for the food, chemical,
wood and metal industries. We use heat and power as our reference sector, because this is
the dominant sector in the NOx system.
Boiler capacity, Capacity, is expected to increase the benefits of adoption and possibly
also lower the cost of adoption through economies of scale, at least for the post-combustion
technologies 18.
Stock effects or external learning
To test for a potential stock or external learning effect, we further include the total number
18This variable is define as a group of dummies and constructed in quartiles. The first quartile is the reference
case.
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of boilers in the industry sector that had the technology installed in the previous year, Sector
comb.t-1, Sector post-comb.t-1 and Sector flue gas.t-1, respectively. If there are learning effects, we
would expect benefits to increase and/or the cost of adoption to decrease with a larger stock
of boilers installed with the technology. In contrast, if there is a stock effect, the benefit of
adoption would decrease with the stock of boilers in the industry already equipped with the
technology.
Internal learning
We also include a measure of plant and firm experience with the relevant technology, indi-
cated by the number of boilers at the plant and firm that had the technology installed in the
previous year, Plant comb.t-1, Plant post-comb.t-1 and Plant flue gas.t-1 and Firm comb.t-1, Firm
post-comb.t-1 and Firm flue gas.t-1, respectively. We would also expect more boilers at the plant
and firm equipped with the new technology to possibly decrease the cost of adoption. We
lack information on the financial situation of the firms which the boilers belong to, but pre-
vious investments at the plant or firm may also proxy for greater financial strength. We lag
these variables as well to avoid the issue of simultaneity in the investment decision at plant
and firm level.
6 Econometric results
In this section we present the results of the ordinary least squares regressions for emission
intensity and output (see Tables 2 and 3) and the Cox proportional hazard model for the
adoption of combustion, post-combustion and flue gas condensation technologies (see Ta-
bles 4, 5 and 6, respectively). We conducted the Cox models for different subsamples to
analyze how the drivers of adoption differ across sectors and counties with standards of dif-
ferent stringency. Thus, in Tables 4, 5, and 6, column (1) shows the estimates for the pooled
sample, column (2) for the heat and power sector, column (3) for boilers in non-heat and
power sectors, and columns (4) and (5) for counties with indications of stringent and lax
emission intensity standards, respectively.
The results including the interaction of Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 with the proxy of green certifi-
cates for the pooled sample in the combustion, post-combustion and flue gas condensation
technology models are presented in Table 7. As robustness checks, we also estimated the
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regressions using the Weibull parametric proportional hazard model. Although the Weibull
model is more restrictive than the Cox model because it assumes a monotonic function of
time of the baseline hazard, it can tell us about the sensitivity of our estimates to changes
in the specification. The results for the Weibull regression are presented in the Appendix in
Table 8.
All the tables present the estimated coefficients and therefore their sign is indicative of
whether an explanatory variable speeds up or retard the adoption decision. Given the non-
linearity of the hazard function and to ease interpretation of the magnitude of these coeffi-
cients throughout the text, the effect of a covariate on the conditional probability of adopting
is calculated as exp(b), i.e., as the hazard ratio. In that manner, exponentiated coefficients
larger than one imply that the covariate increases the hazard of adoption, whereas values
lower than one mean that it decreases the hazard. For example, a hazard ratio of 1.02 indi-
cates that a one unit increase in the explanatory variable increases the hazard of adopting the
technology by 2%. This effect is interpreted as a proportional shift of the hazard rate relative
to the baseline, all other things equal. Likewise, if a hazard ratio is equal to 3, this would
imply that boilers in the analysis group (e.g., belonging to a particular sector) are three times
more likely to adopt compared to the reference group. In this case, it is usual to say that the
likelihood of adoption increases by a factor of 3.
6.1 Emission intensity and output equations
The results indicate that initial emission intensity has a positive and statistical significant
effect on expected emission intensities if adopting the new technology for the three types
of technologies regressions. Also the average emission intensity of firms within the same
sector adopting the new technology until the previous year tend to influence positively the
emission intensity of the generation units when they adopt in the current period. This effect
is statistically significant only for post-combustion and flue gas condensation technologies.
It may be interpreted as the generation units tend to follow the behaviour of other firms in
the same sector, because they might also reduce their emission intensities after adoption,
knowing that other firms in the past have reduced their emission intensities because they
implemented the new technology. Most of the indicator variables of boiler types were statis-
tically significant and exhibited a negative sign. In general, boilers working as backpressure
plant, steam-to-process plant, or other types have lower emission intensities than the hot wa-
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ter production plants. The coefficient of the volume of oxygenwas statistically different from
zero at 1% significance level and its sign was positive for the three technologies, supporting
the fact that the availability of oxygen is an important contributor of the NOx production.
Moreover, the results indicate that the majority of fuel shares and sector variables help to
explain emission intensity. Additionally, the adoption of other NOx reducing technologies
implemented in the past diminishes between 2.5% and 7.8% the emission intensity of the
generation units adopting at present the new technology; the highest reduction is associated
to post-combustion technology.
Similar results were found for the output regressions. In most cases the coefficients for
initial output and the average output of firms adopting the corresponding technology until
the previous period were positive and statistically different from zero. On the one hand,
backpressure plants and other types of plants had higher output than the hot water produc-
tion plants across technologies. On the other hand, when the firms adopted post-combustion
technology, steam-to-process plants had lower output compared to hot water generation
units. Also, the coefficients of some indicator variables for sectors and fuel shares were sta-
tistically significant. As expected the greater is the level of installed capacity, the higher is
the output obtained given the adopted technology.
6.2 Adoption of combustion technologies
The estimated proportional hazard models explaining the diffusion pattern of combustion
technologies are in Table 4. Overall, the results show in general a low explanatory power for
the next charge liabilities and for the other covariates across subsamples.
The net charge liabilities does not influence the hazard of adoption. Although we found
a positive coefficient of the net charge for the pooled sample, the heat and power sector, and
the counties with stringent and lax emission intensity standards, the effect of the net NOx
charge is not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels across all
subsamples.
In the pooled regression, the only covariates that play a role in the adoption decision
are Entrant 1996-1997 and Entrant 1998-2009. The hazard of adopting the technology for the
boilers that entered the program in 1996-1997 is 57% higher than the hazard of the boilers
that entered in 1992-1995. In the case of the boilers that entered in 1998-2009 their likelihood
of adoption increases by a factor of 2.1. The variable Entrant 1998-2009 is also statistically
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significant and positive for the heat and power sector and counties with stringent emission
intensity standards, while Entrant 1996-1997 is statistically significant for counties with lax
emission intensity standards. Entry effects may have been more important for the heat and
power sector since NOx-reducing measures may have greater priority in that sector. For
these potentially relatively new boilers, the cost of installation may be lower, leading them
to adopt soon after entry into the system.
The conditional probability of adopting combustion technologies seems to be indepen-
dent of installing the most expensive type of technology in the previous year, Post-comb.t-1,
except in the case of the counties with stringent emission intensity standards. It seems that
for these counties once the boilers install post-combustion technology there is not much
need for the implementation of combustion measures that might reduce emissions; the haz-
ard of adopting combustion technologies decreases by 47%. Having flue gas condensation
installed appears to influence the likelihood of adoption in the heat and power sector. A
boiler in this sector with flue gas condensation already installed has a 93% higher hazard of
adopting a combustion technology. This result is mainly present when the combustion tech-
nology is flue gas recirculation, indicating complementarity of these two particular types of
technologies.
There seems not to be any statistical difference in the sector dummies for the pooled
model and the rest of subsamples. This result indicates that boilers belonging to a particular
industry are not relatively more prone to adoption, that is, one might find generation units
investing in combustion technology in any sector.
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1, Capacity, and Sector comb.t-1 do not appear to play a role in induc-
ing adoption of combustion technology. We might have expected a positive and significant
coefficient of the relative fuel cost if investment in NOx-reducing technologies would be
more profitable for a boiler which uses more biofuel. However, our price variable does not
capture individual agreements between firms and fuel suppliers regarding fuel prices. For
instance, the presence of middle-term contracts could make firms less responsive to changes
in the prices in the next year. The results are not sensitive to include the interaction variable
Bio/fossil*Green Cert.. In a similar manner, we might have expected a positive coefficient for
this variable given the possible gains of combined heat and power plant burning biofuels,
however with our proxy we do not identify any effect on technology adoption for boilers
that may have been receivers of green certificates. Regarding the insignificant coefficient for
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the group of variables of Capacity in most of the subsamples, a potential explanation is that
combustion technologies are installed at a relative low cost and a viable alternative also at
smaller boilers. The exception is for firms in the heat and power sector, for generation units
with installed capacity more than 70 MW the hazard of adopting combustion technology
increases by a factor of 2.6 compared to boilers with a capacity less than 13 MW.
As expected, internal learning increases adoption; however these effects are only sta-
tistically significant for Plant comb.t-1 in the non-heat and power sectors regression and in
counties estimated to have lax emission intensity standards. For instance, in the counties
with lax standards, having one additional boiler within the same plant already equipped
with a combustion technology increases the likelihood of adoption of another boiler in that
plant by 51%. Neither stock effects nor external learning were observed in our estimation of
combustion technologies.
Our results for the general model are qualitatively similar when we estimate the regres-
sions using a Weibull parametric model. An important difference with the estimates in the
Cox model is that Sector flue gas.t-1 is statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting the pres-
ence of stock effects. Also the likelihood of adoption for boilers with capacity between 29
and 70MW tend to be higher than for those with the smallest capacity. Moreover, there seem
to be differences across sectors in the hazard of adopting combustion technologies.
Statistical testing indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the Weibull shape
parameter is equal to one at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, implying that the base-
line hazard is constant over time. This result is also consistent with Popp (2010)’s argument
that unmeasured learning effects are small because the technologies have been well known
for a long time. Our results also remain largely unchanged when we study the subsample of
boilers who have been part of the NOx scheme since 1992 (see Appendix Table 9).
6.3 Adoption of post-combustion technologies
The estimated proportional hazardmodels explaining the diffusion of post-combustion tech-
nologies are presented in Table 5. Compared to combustion technologies, the covariates for
post-combustion technologies have better explanatory power. The results indicate that the
NOx charge liability is one factor encouraging the adoption of post-combustion technolo-
gies. The effect of the net charge is statistically significantly across all subsamples. The effect
is relatively higher for boilers in the non-heat and power sectors, as well as in those counties
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with stringent standards. An increase of 1 million SEK of the net charge liabilities raises the
hazard of adoption by 14%-50%, other things equal, with the lowest effect in counties with
lax emission intensity standards.
Whether the boiler has combustion or flue gas condensation technology already installed
has no statistically significant effect in the pooled and sector subsamples. However, there are
some differences in the effect of these technologies when classifying counties by stringency
of standards. The effect of a combustion technology installed in the previous year, Comb.t-1,
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in counties with lax standards. In
those counties, a combustion technology already installed increases the hazard of adopting
by a factor of 2.1. Interestingly, this means that in counties with lax standards the low cost
investments of NOx reducing technologies appear to have been first exhausted before plants
moved to more expensive abatement investments.
In the case of flue gas condensation technology, Flue gas cond.t-1 is statistically signifi-
cant in counties with stringent standards. Installing this technology in the previous year
raises the hazard of adopting post-combustion technology by a factor of 2.7. Therefore, com-
plementarities between technologies seem to be associated more with the stringency of the
emission standards: post-combustion and combustion technology in counties with lax stan-
dards, and post-combustion and flue gas condensation technology in counties with stringent
standards. Unfortunately, we do not have the information on individual emission standards
at the boiler level to properly control for this.
As expected, boiler capacity dummies, Capacity have a positive coefficient. However
capacity variables have only a statistically significant effect on the conditional probability of
adoption in the regression of counties with stringent standards. Boilers with capacity more
than 13 MW have higher hazard than the smallest generation units, which is consistent with
the economies of scale related to SCR and SNCR technologies and with firms in counties that
face a stringent emission intensity standard.
A boiler belonging to the Waste incineration sector is more likely to be equipped with a
post-combustion technology than a boiler in the heat and power industry (see columns 1
and 5), while boilers in Other sectors such as the wood, metal food, and chemical sectors are
significantly less likely to be equipped with a post-combustion technology (see columns 1
and 4). That waste incineration boilers are more likely to be equipped with post-combustion
technologies could possibly be explained by the ownership structure of this sector. Waste
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incineration boilers often belong to public utilities which may have motives other than pure
profitability for investing in emission reducing technologies.
Just as in the combustion technology regressions, the expected relative cost of burning
biofuels Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 is also not statistically significant in the post-combustion tech-
nology estimations. This finding is unchanged when the interaction Bio/fossil*Green Cert. is
included (See Table 7). There are no robust indications of a general stock or external learn-
ing effect across the subsamples. Nevertheless, in counties with stringent emission intensity
standards there is some indication of a stock effect.
Consistent with expectations, boilers in the heat and power sector that entered in the pe-
riod 1996-1997 were less likely to adopt than boilers entering in 1992-1995. Internal learning
seems to have been a relevant factor explaining the conditional likelihood of adoption. The
variable Plant post-comb.t-1 was positive and statistically significant in most of the subsam-
ples, while Firm post-comb.t-1 was negative and statistically significant in only two of them.
The highest internal learning effect of Plant post-comb.t-1 is present in the heat and power sec-
tor. The decreased hazard induced by Firm post-comb.t-1 may indicate that internal learning is
counteracted by financial constraints. Alternatively, as shown by Fischer (2011), firms with
market power that are cleaner than average have an incentive to abate less since the market
share adjustment in (6) implies that a larger firm has a lower marginal cost of emissions.
Our results appear not to be very sensitive when we estimate the Weibull parametric
model and when the sample is restricted to the boilers that have been in the the NOx charge
system since 1992 (see Appendix Table 9). The net NOx charge liability is consistently pos-
itive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The magnitude of the effect of
an increase in the net charge liability is roughly similar to that found in the pooled sample
for the Cox model and our results seem robust to changes in the specification of the baseline
hazard. We cannot reject the hypothesis at the 1% significance level that the baseline hazard
is constant over time. As mentioned earlier, this also supports the idea that the unmeasured
learning effects are not significant.
For the entrant boilers in 1992, the effect of the net NOx charge is a bit smaller than in
the general Cox model. An increase of 1 million SEK in the net charge liability increases the
hazard rate by 20%. Interestingly, after controlling for boiler capacity, these boilers tend to
be less responsive to the net charge. The fact that they have faced the regulation for a longer
time than other boilers might be an explanation why after controlling for other factors these
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boilers tend to be less responsive to the net charge, perhaps the effect for these generation
units is attenuated over time.
6.4 Adoption of flue gas condensation technology
The models explaining diffusion of flue gas condensation technologies are found in Table 6.
The net NOx charge liability has no statistically significant effect in either specification. This
indicates that the net charge is not a major driver for investments in flue gas condensation
technology.
Having a post-combustion technology already installed has a positive but non-significant
effect for the pooled sample. However, the sign of Post-comb. tech.t-1 is positive and signif-
icant for the non-heat and power sectors and generation units in counties with stringent
standards, indicating that the two technologies are somehow complementary. One possible
explanation of the positive effect of Post-comb. tech.t-1 on flue gas condensation technology in
counties with stringent emission intensity standards could be that already being equipped
with a post-combustion technology in these counties is an indicator of being subject to a
relatively more stringent individual standard, which further raises the incentives to become
more energy efficient.
Having a combustion technology installed has a positive but non-significant effect on
the hazard of adopting flue gas condensation technology for most subsamples. However,
in the regression of non-heat and power sectors, combustion technology installed in the
previous year showed a significant effect. Therefore, among the non-heat and power sectors,
it appears that having either of the two other technologies already installed significantly
increases the likelihood of also investing in flue gas condensation.
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 is positive and significant at the 5% level in the pooled sample and at
10% level for non-heat and power sectors. Generally, since flue gas condensation can greatly
improve heat output, a positive effect would be expected, but it is not consistently supported
across all subsamples. When the interaction Bio/fossil*Green Cert. is added to the regression,
it is not statistically significant but the effect of Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 on flue gas condensation
adoption remains unaltered. For Capacity, it seems that in the heat and power sectors, larger
boilers are less likely to adopt flue gas condensation than smaller generation units.
Boilers in the Waste incineration sector do not significantly differ from boilers in the heat
and power sector in their likelihood of being equipped with flue gas condensation technol-
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ogy. However, boilers in the Pulp-paper sector and other non-heat and powers sectors are
significantly less likely to be installed with flue gas condensation technology than a boiler in
the heat and power sector. Belonging to the Pulp-paper sector in the pooled sample on aver-
age reduces the hazard of adoption by 83% while belonging to the Other sectors reduces the
hazard by 90%.
Entrant 1996-1997 has a consistently negative effect which is significant in the pooled
sample, the non-heat and power sector, and the subsample for counties with stringent stan-
dards. This is an indication of an entry effect in the sense that the profitability of investing in
flue gas condensation appears to be larger for boilers entering the system before 1996. How-
ever, the negative coefficient on Entrant 1998-2009 is not significant in either specification,
not supporting a general negative effect of late entry.
The negative sign on Sector flue gas.t-1 is consistent with a stock effect but it is very small
even in the pooled sample where it is significant. One more boiler in the same sector with
flue gas condensation installedwould reduce the hazard of adoption by 1.3%. When it comes
to the internal learning variables, Plant flue gas.t-1 is only positive for the non-heat and power
subsample and Firm flue gas.t-1 is positive and significant in the counties with lax standards
and in the subsample of non-heat and power sectors, not really supporting the existence of
any general internal learning effects.
Comparing the results for the pooled sample with results for the parametric estimation
in the Appendix Table 8, there are just slight differences in the magnitude of the coefficients
but signs remain the same. The Weibull shape parameter is significantly larger than 1, in-
dicating a baseline hazard which increases over time. Generally, the level of significance of
the coefficients increases with the Weibull specification which reflects the fact that a fully
parametric estimation tend to be more efficient.
Looking at the separate estimation in the Appendix Table 9 for the boilers that entered the
NOx charge system in 1992, we note that results are slightly different from the pooled sample
in Table 6. The effect of having a post-combustion technology installed in the previous year is
significant and increases the hazard of adoption. Possibly non-observed individual emission
standards could be an explanation if, among the boilers with a post-combustion technology
that entered the system in 1992, the ones that produced with a lower emission intensity
also were subject to a more stringent individual standard that raised the incentives to adopt
also flue gas condensation technology. The coefficients estimated of the dummy variables of
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Capacity indicate that the smallest boilers were more prone to install flue gas condensation
technology, a similar result obtained for the subsample of heat and power sector.
7 Conclusions
The refunded emission payment scheme has been in place in Sweden since 1992 to reduce
NOx emissions from large combustion plants. Previous studies have shown that the charge
induced a sizable reduction in emission intensities in the early years of implementation. In
this paper, we investigate the factors affecting the decision to invest in NOx-reducing and
energy efficiency improving technologies.
We primarily find results on drivers behind the adoption of post-combustion technolo-
gies. Adoption of post-combustion technologies is in general more likely in the waste incin-
eration sector, which can possibly be explained by a comparatively large degree of public
ownership in this sector. Because the NOx charge scheme, on the net, only taxes the firms
which are dirtier than average, we tested the hypothesis that the net charge liabilities stimu-
lates adoption. However, the net NOx charge per unit of energy did not seem to encourage
adoption of combustion or flue gas condensation technologies. The net NOx charge only
plays a role in stimulating adoption of the most expensive technologies: post-combustion
installations. Because these types of technologies can be characterized as end-of-pipe solu-
tions which allow firms to choose emissions independently from output to a much larger
extent than the other technologies, this result might be simply driven by larger potential
gains for boilers with initially higher emission levels.
The capacity of the boiler tend to increase the likelihood of adoption of post-combustion
technologies in counties with stringent standards, which is in linewith the expected economies
of scale. There are also indications of an internal learning effect such that more boilers al-
ready installed with post-combustion technologies at the plant increases the likelihood of
adoption. In contrast, in the heat and power industry, more boilers at the next step of aggre-
gation, the firm, makes adoption less likely. A potential explanation is that firms with a large
share of the useful energy output in the refunding system has reduced incentives to abate
emissions because of the negative effect of abatement on the size of the refund.
The Swedish NOx charge and refunding scheme is complex, as are the causalities and
timing involved, and this topic would benefit from a more detailed future study of the dy-
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namics of plant regulations if more data becomes available. Disentangling the incentives for
investment in different types of environmental technologies provided by this scheme is also
a potential area for future research.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Emission standards and actual emissions (in terms of mg NOx per MJ of fuel) in
2001 for boilers which were in the NOx charge system in both 1997 and 2001 (SEPA, 2003).
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Figure 2: Emission standards and actual emissions (average over 1992-2009) for boilers
which were randomly sampled for the SEPA(2012) report and also subject to emission stan-
dards in terms of mg NOx per MJ of fuel. Data supplied by SEPA. Averages at plant level.
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Figure 3: Diffusion of post-combustion, combustion and flue gas condensation technology
among the boilers in the joint sample for all three proportional hazard models.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Combustion tech. 0.41 0.49 0 1 4860
Post-comb. tech. 0.29 0.45 0 1 4860
Flue gas cond. tech. 0.25 0.43 0 1 4860
Plant comb.,t-1 0.78 1.01 0 4 4860
Firm comb.,t-1 2.95 4.59 0 20 4860
Sector comb.,t-1 46.89 37.12 0 130 4860
Plant post-comb.,t-1 0.57 0.97 0 5 4860
Firm post-comb.,t-1 2.07 3.38 0 14 4860
Sector post-comb.,t-1 31.57 24.3 0 87 4860
Plant flue gas.,t-1 0.44 0.76 0 5 4860
Firm flue gas.,t-1 1.77 3.37 0 17 4860
Sector flue gas.,t-1 37.99 41.72 0 115 4860
Net charge liability (comb.) 0.02 1.11 -7.66 9.91 2861
Net charge liability (post.) 0.02 1.13 -11.07 10.3 3398
Net charge liability (flue.) 0.06 1.2 -8.79 8.75 3464
Bio/fossil fuel cost,t+1 12.71 15.83 0 78.23 4860
Bio/fossil*Green Cert. 2.7 8.35 0 39.69 4860
Capacity less 13 MW 0.24 0.43 0 1 4860
Capacity 13-29 MW 0.25 0.43 0 1 4860
Capacity 29-70 MW 0.24 0.43 0 1 4860
Capacity more 70 MW 0.27 0.44 0 1 4860
Heat-power sector 0.49 0.5 0 1 524
Pulp-paper sector 0.158 0.365 0 1 524
Waste incineration 0.126 0.332 0 1 524
Wood industry 0.101 0.302 0 1 524
Chemical industry 0.073 0.26 0 1 524
Food industry 0.038 0.192 0 1 524
Metal industry 0.013 0.115 0 1 524
Entrant 1996-1997 0.267 0.443 0 1 524
Entrant 1998-2009 0.302 0.459 0 1 524
Notes: Net charge liability (comb.), Net charge liability (post.) and Net charge liability (flue.) are the pre-
dicted net charge liabilities for combustion, post-combustion and flue gas condensation technologies,
respectively.
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Table 2: Estimation of emission intensity given adoption of technology.
Variable Combustion Post- Flue gas
Combustion condensation
Initial Emission Intensity 0.1709*** 0.2652*** 0.2425***
(0.0141) (0.0186) (0.0256)
EI of adopters until t-1 0.0544 0.2606*** 0.2755**
(0.0540) (0.0723) (0.1187)
Boiler type Nr.3 -0.0539*** -0.0805*** -0.0735***
(0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0057)
Boiler type Nr.5 -0.0253*** -0.0038 -0.0345***
(0.0061) (0.0093) (0.0078)
Other boiler types -0.0214** -0.1326*** 0.0188
(0.0100) (0.0235) (0.0135)
Volume of oxygen 0.0203*** 0.0181*** 0.0247***
(0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0037)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 -0.0781*** - -0.0725***
(0.0055) (0.0059)
Combustion tech.t 1 - -0.0248*** -0.0034
(0.0050) (0.0050)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 -0.0306*** -0.0328*** -
(0.0044) (0.0054)
Oil sharet 1 0.0010*** -0.0019*** 0.0008
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Coal sharet 1 0.0014*** -0.0018*** 0.0011***
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Bio sharet 1 0.0011*** -0.0017*** 0.0007***
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Peat sharet 1 0.0010*** -0.0017*** 0.0010***
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Waste sharet 1 0.0011*** -0.0020*** 0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Pulp-paper sector 0.0210** -0.0216* 0.0285*
(0.0088) (0.0120) (0.0171)
Waste incineration -0.0077 0.0075 -0.0050
(0.0160) (0.0100) (0.0076)
Other sectors 0.0142*** -0.0624*** 0.0141
(0.0051) (0.0227) (0.0111)
Observations 2292 1723 1550
R2 0.37 0.44 0.45
F 97.32 63.80 87.28
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Ordinary Least Squares Model for emission intensities
given the adoption of technology for (1) combustion technologies, (2) post-combustion technologies,
and (3) flue gas condensation technology for the pooled sample 1992-2009. The dependent variable
is emission intensity (emission/output). EI of adopters until t-1 is the average emission intensity of
firms adopting until t-1. Boiler types: Nr.3 is backpressure plant, Nr.5 is steam-to-process plant. Other
boiler types include condensing power plants (Nr.2), gas turbine (Nr.4) and the rest of production
units (Nr.6). The reference case is hot water production plant (Nr.1). Standard errors, in parentheses,
are robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Estimation of output given adoption of technology.
Variable Combustion Post- Flue gas
Combustion condensation
Initial output 0.733*** 0.666*** 0.419***
(0.035) (0.051) (0.065)
q of adopters until t-1 0.244* -0.215 0.449**
(0.128) (0.280) (0.227)
Boiler type Nr.3 37759.546*** 73409.156*** 54734.680***
(7572.064) (9593.802) (8904.727)
Boiler type Nr.5 5068.043 -44279.390*** -5851.119
(4154.579) (12659.209) (8412.503)
Other boiler types 21977.359* 170298.018*** 87567.756***
(12536.829) (28160.578) (17035.125)
Capacity 13-29 MWt 1 16645.091*** 29633.802*** 27301.340***
(2671.283) (4634.745) (3976.677)
Capacity 29-70 MWt 1 78257.978*** 91122.242*** 110583.892***
(5916.500) (10498.056) (10089.112)
Capacity more 70 MWt 1 123423.322*** 222708.690*** 339509.103***
(11760.771) (16901.240) (16040.088)
Oil sharet 1 386.798*** -1293.609*** 3249.325***
(95.925) (278.989) (809.045)
Coal sharet 1 756.411 -417.471 5203.430***
(510.605) (401.200) (768.100)
Bio sharet 1 751.797*** 90.214 1663.718***
(76.860) (228.041) (194.816)
Peat sharet 1 385.794* -406.638 1903.062***
(199.588) (337.957) (245.587)
Waste sharet 1 1023.103*** 199.847 2363.771***
(140.524) (243.148) (213.545)
Pulp-paper sector 3212.492 24579.738 -144598.8***
(7439.435) (27575.476) (45731.341)
Waste incineration 6099.566 -49966.076 -46812.526***
(12978.683) (50511.521) (10147.271)
Other sectors 56833.597*** 9263.957 48521.844***
(18112.484) (48640.042) (12903.251)
Observations 2292 1723 1550
R2 0.69 0.60 0.74
F 338.80 294.02 233.46
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Ordinary Least Squares Model for output given the
adoption of technology for (1) combustion technologies, (2) post-combustion technologies, and (3) flue
gas condensation technology for the pooled sample 1992-2009. The dependent variable is output. q of
adopters until t-1 is the average output of firms adopting until t-1. Boiler types: Nr.3 is backpressure
plant, Nr.5 is steam-to-process plant. Other boiler types include condensing power plants (Nr.2), gas
turbine (Nr.4) and the rest of production units (Nr.6). The reference case is hot water production plant
(Nr.1). Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Adoption of combustion technologies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Pooled Heat & Power Non-Heat Stringent Lax
& Power counties counties
Net charge liabilities 0.049 0.082 -0.046 0.077 0.034
(0.078) (0.070) (0.130) (0.105) (0.096)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 -0.198 -0.452 0.028 -0.626** 0.319
(0.251) (0.370) (0.294) (0.304) (0.352)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 0.313 0.656*** 0.154 0.285 0.433
(0.204) (0.248) (0.380) (0.255) (0.335)
Capacity 13-29 MW 0.041 0.328 -0.059 -0.063 0.056
(0.259) (0.428) (0.345) (0.337) (0.349)
Capacity 29-70 MW 0.373 0.616 0.361 0.390 0.197
(0.314) (0.515) (0.387) (0.413) (0.414)
Capacity more 70 MW 0.104 0.951** -0.570 0.504 -0.556
(0.347) (0.484) (0.438) (0.397) (0.460)
Entrant 1996-1997 0.449* 0.493 0.385 0.194 0.733*
(0.249) (0.381) (0.329) (0.362) (0.393)
Entrant 1998-2009 0.740** 0.827** 0.535 0.736* 0.629
(0.309) (0.397) (0.442) (0.392) (0.444)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Plant comb.t 1 0.157 0.003 0.296** -0.018 0.412**
(0.148) (0.201) (0.146) (0.177) (0.172)
Firm comb.t 1 0.025 0.030 0.022 0.029 0.005
(0.020) (0.032) (0.029) (0.024) (0.032)
Sector comb.t 1 -0.009 - - -0.007 -0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Pulp-paper sector -0.193 - - 0.109 -0.286
(0.320) (0.368) (0.623)
Waste incineration -0.201 - - 0.047 -0.463
(0.297) (0.397) (0.453)
Other sectors -0.523 - - -0.238 -0.571
(0.362) (0.419) (0.811)
Observations 2861 1298 1563 1591 1270
No. of subjects 435 206 229 247 188
No. of failures 179 80 99 103 76
Log likelihood -895.24 -335.13 -435.81 -455.76 -311.06
Chi-squared 21.36 30.23 22.80 21.64 57.97
P-value 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model from five sub-samples for the period
1992-2009. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has a combustion technology
installed; zero otherwise. (1) General model for the pooled sample with sector dummies. The variable ”Other sectors”
is a dummy variable for boilers in the wood, metal, food, and chemical industries, while the reference group is heat
& power sector. (2) Estimates for heat and power sector, (3) estimates for other sectors, (4) estimates for counties with
stringent emission intensity standards, and (5) estimates for counties with lax emission intensity standards. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within firm-level clusters. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Adoption of postcombustion technologies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Pooled Heat & Power Non-Heat Stringent Lax
& Power counties counties
Net charge liabilities 0.228*** 0.222*** 0.407*** 0.309*** 0.135*
(0.052) (0.059) (0.123) (0.096) (0.078)
Combustion tech.t 1 0.122 0.413 0.055 -0.616 0.761**
(0.277) (0.352) (0.322) (0.540) (0.300)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 0.382 0.318 0.761 0.995** -0.102
(0.320) (0.424) (0.501) (0.428) (0.479)
Capacity 13-29 MW 0.621 1.394 0.641 2.352** -0.230
(0.505) (0.868) (0.552) (1.144) (0.563)
Capacity 29-70 MW 0.804 0.995 0.662 2.191* 0.501
(0.517) (0.920) (0.576) (1.197) (0.543)
Capacity more 70 MW 0.766 1.259 0.581 2.174* 0.527
(0.530) (0.992) (0.577) (1.155) (0.616)
Entrant 1996-1997 -0.017 -1.298* 0.258 -1.629 0.198
(0.393) (0.674) (0.478) (1.143) (0.566)
Entrant 1998-2009 0.604 -0.018 0.985* 0.858* 0.181
(0.457) (0.675) (0.588) (0.482) (0.739)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 0.000 0.008 -0.005 0.012 -0.012
(0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Plant post-comb.t 1 0.328* 0.976*** 0.301 0.559* 0.547**
(0.173) (0.225) (0.210) (0.332) (0.218)
Firm post-comb.t 1 -0.060 -0.189*** 0.040 -0.191** 0.052
(0.041) (0.045) (0.053) (0.079) (0.042)
Sector post-comb.t 1 -0.015 - - -0.033* 0.008
(0.014) (0.019) (0.022)
Pulp-paper sector -0.014 - - -0.159 0.034
(0.363) (0.489) (0.534)
Waste incineration 0.994*** - - 0.631 1.387***
(0.340) (0.502) (0.366)
Other sectors -1.712** - - -2.144*** -1.446
(0.671) (0.792) (1.578)
Observations 3398 1614 1784 1957 1441
No. of subjects 434 212 222 248 186
No. of failures 111 45 66 52 59
Log likelihood -532.67 -177.76 -288.65 -207.06 -228.66
Chi-squared 173.73 85.89 68.12 107.01 89.52
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model from five sub-samples for the period
1992-2009. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has a post-combustion technology
installed; zero otherwise. (1) General model for the pooled sample with sector dummies. The variable ”Other sectors”
is a dummy variable for boilers in the wood, metal, food, and chemical industries, while the reference group is heat
& power sector. (2) Estimates for heat and power sector, (3) estimates for other sectors, (4) estimates for counties with
stringent emission intensity standards, and (5) estimates for counties with lax emission intensity standards. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within firm-level clusters. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Adoption of flue gas condensation technology.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Pooled Heat & Power Non-Heat Stringent Lax
& Power counties counties
Net charge liabilities 0.010 0.131 -0.132 0.025 0.149
(0.072) (0.083) (0.171) (0.102) (0.134)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 0.453 0.639 1.350*** 1.186*** -0.735
(0.295) (0.392) (0.363) (0.303) (0.677)
Combustion tech.t 1 0.282 0.138 0.835** 0.129 0.355
(0.227) (0.273) (0.350) (0.349) (0.390)
Capacity 13-29 MW 0.078 -0.414 0.936 -0.066 0.401
(0.398) (0.425) (0.732) (0.597) (0.541)
Capacity 29-70 MW 0.005 -0.448 0.298 -0.120 0.380
(0.402) (0.598) (0.700) (0.582) (0.739)
Capacity more 70 MW -0.629 -1.580*** 0.091 -0.872 0.144
(0.503) (0.574) (0.817) (0.609) (0.837)
Entrant 1996-1997 -0.818*** -1.001** -0.739 -1.865* -0.592
(0.318) (0.486) (0.613) (0.976) (0.536)
Entrant 1998-2009 -0.072 0.016 -0.190 -0.225 -0.093
(0.421) (0.607) (0.673) (0.438) (0.945)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 0.014** 0.001 0.018* -0.002 0.026
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017)
Plant flue gas.t 1 -0.115 -0.364 0.422* 0.020 -0.182
(0.235) (0.592) (0.223) (0.204) (0.403)
Firm flue gas.t 1 0.040 0.050 0.056* 0.032 0.080**
(0.029) (0.043) (0.030) (0.050) (0.041)
Sector flue gas.t 1 -0.013* - - -0.016 -0.010
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Pulp-paper sector -1.749*** - - -1.450* -1.953***
(0.572) (0.773) (0.706)
Waste incineration 0.147 - - -0.134 0.764
(0.422) (0.400) (0.852)
Other sectors -2.293*** - - -3.622*** -1.884**
(0.597) (1.310) (0.820)
Observations 3464 1400 2064 1897 1567
No. of subjects 405 178 227 234 171
No. of failures 87 44 43 49 38
Log likelihood -428.76 -186.05 -188.69 -202.42 -153.13
Chi-squared 64.50 21.96 39.75 118.31 63.66
P-value 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model from five sub-samples for the period
1992-2009. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has flue gas condensation technology
installed; zero otherwise. (1) General model for the pooled sample with sector dummies. The variable ”Other sectors” is a
dummy variable for boilers in the wood, metal, food, and chemical industries, while the reference group is heat & power
sector. (2) Estimates for heat and power sector, (3) estimates for other sectors, (4) estimates for counties with stringent
emission intensity standards, and (5) estimates for counties with lax emission intensity standards. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within firm-level clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Adoption of technologies including the interaction of
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 with a proxy for green certificates.
Variable Combustion Post- Flue gas
Combustion condensation
Net charge liabilities 0.046 0.226*** 0.010
(0.076) (0.052) (0.072)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 -0.194 - 0.452
(0.251) (0.293)
Combustion tech.t 1 - 0.126 0.283
(0.273) (0.226)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 0.307 0.385 -
(0.210) (0.320)
Capacity 13-29 MW 0.021 0.618 0.083
(0.267) (0.503) (0.393)
Capacity 29-70 MW 0.354 0.794 0.014
(0.319) (0.511) (0.397)
Capacity more 70 MW 0.090 0.762 -0.628
(0.356) (0.527) (0.499)
Entrant 1996-1997 0.460* -0.019 -0.824***
(0.249) (0.392) (0.319)
Entrant 1998-2009 0.730** 0.590 -0.070
(0.318) (0.455) (0.417)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 -0.005 -0.000 0.015**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Bio/fossil*Green Cert. 0.012 0.008 -0.005
(0.016) (0.019) (0.027)
Plant tech.t 1 0.170 0.342** -0.123
(0.139) (0.173) (0.250)
Firm tech.t 1 0.023 -0.063 0.041
(0.019) (0.040) (0.031)
Sector tech.t 1 -0.011* -0.017 -0.013*
(0.006) (0.016) (0.008)
Observations 2861 3398 3464
No. of subjects 435 434 405
No. of failures 179 111 87
Log likelihood -894.86 -532.57 -428.73
Chi-squared 27.44 179.21 64.95
P value 0.04 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model for (1) combustion
technologies, (2) post-combustion technologies, and (3) flue gas condensation technology for the
pooled sample 1992-2009. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the
boiler has one of the technologies installed described above and zero otherwise. Bio/fossil*Green
Cert. is the interaction of the relative fuel cost with a proxy for green certificates that takes the
value of 1 if the boiler potentially was a receiver of green certificates, and zero otherwise. Plant,
Firm and Sector tech.t 1 are the number of units within the plant, firm, or sector that adopted the
corresponding technology in t-1. Sector dummies are not shown to save space. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within firm-level clusters.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Adoption of technologies. Parametric estimations using Weibull
distribution.
Variable Combustion Post- Flue gas
Combustion condensation
Net charge liabilities 0.092 0.263*** -0.002
(0.086) (0.057) (0.075)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 -0.402 - 0.528*
(0.275) (0.311)
Combustion tech.t 1 - -0.095 0.261
(0.275) (0.252)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 0.323 0.427 -
(0.215) (0.315)
Capacity 13-29 MW 0.090 0.598 0.167
(0.248) (0.494) (0.449)
Capacity 29-70 MW 0.517* 0.903* 0.069
(0.305) (0.514) (0.444)
Capacity more 70 MW 0.185 0.851 -0.640
(0.352) (0.533) (0.527)
Entrant 1996-1997 0.201 -0.317 -1.112***
(0.228) (0.357) (0.323)
Entrant 1998-2009 0.656** 0.589 -0.243
(0.283) (0.403) (0.432)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 -0.005 0.002 0.017**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Plant tech.t 1 0.073 0.241 -0.249
(0.162) (0.214) (0.231)
Firm tech.t 1 0.026 -0.052 0.049*
(0.021) (0.043) (0.028)
Sector tech.t 1 -0.028*** -0.069** -0.044***
(0.008) (0.031) (0.010)
Pulp-paper sector -1.230*** -1.072 -3.927***
(0.387) (0.655) (0.902)
Waste incineration -0.862** 0.847** -0.949
(0.407) (0.369) (0.609)
Other sectors -1.623*** -3.972*** -4.688***
(0.547) (1.472) (0.891)
Observations 2861 3398 3464
No. of subjects 435 434 405
No. of failures 179 111 87
Log likelihood -302.31 -219.24 -163.30
Chi-squared 51.18 199.31 61.89
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weibull shape parameter 1.17 1.69 3.11
P value 0.49 0.10 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the parametric proportional hazard model with Weibull
distribution for (1) combustion technologies, (2) post-combustion technologies, and (3) flue gas con-
densation technology for the pooled sample 1992-2009. The dependent variable is an indicator vari-
able equal to one if the boiler has one of the technologies installed described above and zero oth-
erwise. Plant, Firm and Sector tech.t 1 are the number of units within the plant, firm, or sector
that adopted the corresponding technology in t-1. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within firm-level clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Adoption of technologies for boilers that entered the NOx
charge system since 1992.
Variable Combustion Post- Flue gas
Combustion condensation
Net charge liabilities 0.033 0.186*** -0.147
(0.100) (0.041) (0.104)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 0.265 - 0.579**
(0.370) (0.284)
Combustion tech.t 1 - -0.191 0.068
(0.329) (0.309)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 0.429 -0.151 -
(0.395) (0.498)
Capacity 29-70 MW 0.373 -0.178 -0.601*
(0.289) (0.309) (0.344)
Capacity more 70 MW 0.293 -0.104 -1.204***
(0.297) (0.335) (0.408)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 -0.013 0.001 0.012
(0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
Plant tech.t 1 0.221 0.763*** -0.142
(0.228) (0.242) (0.632)
Firm tech.t 1 0.106** -0.005 0.065
(0.053) (0.050) (0.042)
Sector tech.t 1 -0.030*** 0.019 0.004
(0.011) (0.014) (0.006)
Observations 1026 1066 1380
No. of subjects 112 112 110
No. of failures 67 63 50
Log likelihood -279.40 -268.73 -215.45
Chi-squared 17.34 55.92 20.63
P-value 0.04 0.00 0.01
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model for (1) combus-
tion technologies, (2) post-combustion technologies, and (3) flue gas condensation technology for
the sample of boilers that entered the NOx charge system in 1992 and continued operating until
2009. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has one of the
technologies installed described above and zero otherwise. Sector dummies are excluded due to
few observations in some sectors. Installed capacity less than 29 MW is the reference case. Plant,
Firm and Sector tech.t 1 are the number of units within the plant, firm, or sector that adopted the
corresponding technology in t-1. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity
and arbitrary correlation within firm-level clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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